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Case No. 20090410-SC 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Petitioner, 
vs. 
WILLIAM THOMAS DOMINGUEZ, 
Defendant/ Respondent. 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals from its opinion in State v. Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, 206 P.3d 640 
(Addendum A). The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-3-102(5) (WestSupp. 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does a violation of rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
constitute a Fourth Amendment violation requiring suppression of the 
evidence? 
2. Is suppression of the evidence required under state law when a 
magistrate fails to comply with the retention requirement of rule 40(i) of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
Standard of Review. On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the decision 
of the court of appeals for correctness. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, f^ 9, 22 P.3d 
1242. "The correctness of the court of appeals7 decision turns on whether that 
court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate 
standard of review." Id. Whether a violation of a procedural rule constitutes a 
constitutional violation is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Burns 
v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, ^ 6, 133 P.3d 370 (holding that "the application of 
constitutional protections [is a] question[ ] of law" reviewed for correctness)/ 
The question of what remedy to apply when a magistrate fails to comply with 
the retention requirements of rule 40 is a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. Cf. Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, % 19, P.3d 
(holdmg that "the question of what standard applies to determine an abuse of 
privilege presents a question of law, which we review for correctness"). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following provisions are reproduced in Addendum B: U.S. Const. 
amend. IV; Utah R. Crim. P. 30; Utah R. Crim. P. 40. 
_?-
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with felony DUI, driving with alcohol in his body 
with a no-alcohol license, driving on a revoked license, driving a veliicle without 
proof of insurance, and engaging in a speed contest or exhibition. R. 2-3. 
Defendant moved to suppress the blood alcohol evidence obtained pursuant to 
a telephonic search warrant on the ground that the magistrate failed to comply 
with the retention requirement of rule 40, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. R. 
17-18. The trial court denied the motion. R. 26-27, 29-30, 51. Defendant 
thereafter entered conditional guilty pleas to DUI and no proof of insurance, 
reserving his right to appeal the order denying his motion to suppress. R. 32-40. 
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences of zero-to-five years for DUI 
and 180 days for no proof of insurance. R. 40. 
Defendant appealed and the court of appeals reversed. Dominguez, 2009 
UT App 73, at f^ 1. The court held that "the magistrate's failure to comply with 
[the retention requirement of] rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
violated [Defendant's] Fourth Amendment rights/' requiring suppression. See 
id. at Tf 1. It also held that suppression was required under this Court's decision 
in Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79,206 P.3d 640. See Dominguez, 2006 UT App 73, 
If 17. This Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Shortly after 1:00 a.m. on June 3, 2007, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper 
Chris Turley stopped Dominguez for racing with another car. R. 22-23. In 
speaking with Dominguez, Turley noticed that he "had red, bloodshot, glassy 
looking eyes" and "that his speech was noticeably slurred." R. 23. When a 
records check revealed that Dominguez's alcohol-restricted driver's license had 
been revoked, Turley arrested him. R. 23. Wliile doing so, Turley "could smell 
a strong odor of an alcohol beverage coming from [Dominguez7s] breath in the 
open air." R. 23. Turley asked Dominguez to blow into a portable breathalyzer, 
but Dominguez refused. R. 23. He also refused to submit to field sobriety tests. 
R. 23. Turley read the applicable "DUI admonitions," but Dominguez "still 
would not cooperate and refused to give a chemical test." R. 23. 
After transporting Dominguez to the police station, Turley prepared a 
written affidavit in support of a search warrant authorizing a blood draw. R. 51: 
3. Shortly after 2:00 a.m., Turley telephoned Judge Brent West and informed 
him "of the subject's name, the reason for the stop, [and] all of the clues [he] 
observed . . . ." R. 51: 4-5. After being placed under oath, Turley read the 
probable cause statement contained in the written affidavit. R. 51:5. Turley did 
not read every line of the affidavit, but read verbatim that portion "establishing 
the grounds for issuance of [the] search warrant," to wit: 
-4-
On June 3rd 2007, at approximately 0102 hours, I observed a red 
Honda Civic driving- southbound on Washington Boulevard at 
2400 South in lane 1 racing a silver passenger car. The vehicle was 
stopped by the activation of my emergency lights. I approached 
the vehicle and William Dominguez [Defendant] was in the driver 
seat not wearing a seat belt. Dominguez had red, bloodshot, glassy 
looking eyes. As I spoke with Dominguez, I noticed that his speech 
was noticeably slurred. I conducted a records check on Dominguez 
using; his name and date of birth. This information revealed that 
Dominguez had a [sic] alcohol revoked license and was an alcohol 
restricted driver. Dominguez denied consuming any alcohol. I 
placed Dominguez under arrest and could smell a strong odor of 
an alcohol beverage coming from his breath in the open air. 
I requested Dominguez blow into a portable breath tester, however 
he refused to blow. When asked if he would allow me to conduct 
field sobriety test, Dominguez said no and that he had been 
through this before. Dominguez refused to submit to any DUI field 
sobriety tests. I read Dominguez his DUI admonitions advising 
him of the consequences of not submitting to my tests. Dominguez 
still would not cooperate and refused to give a chemical test. 
Dominguez has at least 4 prior DUI convictions in the past 10 years 
and he is currently on parole for a felony DUI conviction. 
R. 22-23; R. 51: 4-5. At 2:27 a.m., and at the direction of Judge West, Trooper 
Turley signed the warrant authorizing the blood draw. R. 24; R. 51: 5-6. 
Judge West did not record the testimony given by Turley over the 
telephone, and thus was unable, "[a]t the time of issuance,.. . [to] retain and 
seal a copy of the search warrant, the application and all affidavits or other 
recorded testimony on which the warrant [was] based/' as required under rule 
40. See Utah R. Crim. P. 40(i)(l). Judge Ernest Jones signed a return on the 
search warrant the following day. R. 25; R. 51: 6. 
-o-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the 
testimony supporting a search warrant be recorded and that a copy of the 
recording be retained by the magistrate at the time the search warrant is issued. 
The Fourth Amendment imposes no such requirements. Accordingly, pursuant 
to well-settled United States Supreme Court precedent, a violation of rule 40's 
retention requirement does not rise to a Fourth Amendment violation subject to 
suppression under the exclusionary rule. 
Suppression is also not required under state law. In Anderson v. Taylor, 
2006 UT 79,149 P.3d 352, this Court imposed a requirement on magistrates to 
retain copies of all warrants issued and their supporting affidavits. The Court 
also directed the adoption of a rule to implement its retention requirement. 
However, it did not address the remedy to be applied in criminal cases when a 
magistrate fails to comply with the retention requirement. Because rule 40, 
which implements Anderson, does not specify a remedy, violations of the rule 
are subject to harmless error analysis under rule 30 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Dominguez has not claimed, much less demonstrated, any 
prejudice. Therefore, suppression of the evidence is not warranted. 
This Court should thus reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
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ARGUMENT 
The magistrate in this case did not record his telephone conversation with 
Trooper Turley and thus was unable "[a]t the time of issuance, . . . [to] retain 
and seal a copy of the search warrant, the application and all affidavits or other 
recorded testimony on which the warrant [was] based/' as required under rule 
40. See Utah R. Grim. P. 40(i)(l). Contrary to the decision of the court of appeals 
below, suppression of the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant is not 
required under either the Fourth Amendment or Utah law.1 
I. 
A MAGISTRATE'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE 
RETENTION REQUIREMENT OF RULE 40 OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE A FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION 
In the court of appeals, Dominguez argued "that the magistrate's failure 
to comply with rule 40 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure violated his 
1
 The recording requirement of rule 40(Z) was satisfied when Trooper 
Turley reduced the search warrant affidavit to writing. See Utah R. Crim. P. 40 
(a)(2), (Z)(2) (providing that recording "includes the original recording of 
testimony" and may be "by writing"). Although rule 40 does not explicitly 
impose a recording duty on the magistrate, the court of appeals held that in the 
case of telephonic warrants, magistrates have a recording duty by reason of their 
duty to retain the search warrant documents. Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, \ 11. 
The State maintains that magistrates have no duty to retain that which they have 
never obtained, but assumes the correctness of the court of appeals' holding for 
purposes of the questions presented here. Alternatively, the Court should 
recognize an exception to the retention requirement where compliance is 
impractical. As a matter of public policy, it is better for officers to obtain judicial 
approval for a search than have to rely on the exigent circumstances exception. 
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Fourth Amendment rights/7 Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, %^ 1, 6. The court of 
appeals "agree[d]." Id. at ^ 1. The court's holding squarely conflicts with 
controlling Fourth Amendment precedent and should be reversed. 
* * * 
Last year, the United States Supreme Court reiterated that" 'whether or 
not a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment ' . . . has 
never ' depend [ed] on the law of the particular State in which the search 
occurs.'" Virginia v. Moore, _ U.S. _ , 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604 (2008) (quoting 
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988)). The Court acknowledged that 
States are "free 'to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than 
required by the Federal Constitution.'" Id. (quoting Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 62). 
The Court held, however, that "when States go above the Fourth Amendment 
minimum, the Constitution's protections conceriiing search and seizure remain 
the same." Id. at 1605. In other words, "[a] State is free to prefer one search-
and-seizure policy among the range of constitutionally permissible options, but 
its choice of a more restrictive option does not render the less restrictive ones 
unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional." Id. at 1606. 
Against this backdrop of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court in 
Moore addressed whether an arrest for a misdemeanor offense, prohibited under 
state law, constituted a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 1601. The Supreme 
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Court held that it did not. The Court observed that pursuant to a long line of 
cases, an arrest is "constitutionally reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment so 
long as the officer "has probable cause to believe [the arrestee] committed even a 
minor crime in his presence/' Moore, 129 S.Ct. at 1604. The Court concluded 
that California's law prohibiting misdemeanor arrests did not "chang[e] this 
calculus/' See id. 
Like the California law prohibiting misdemeanor arrests, Utah's 
requirement that magistrates retain the search warrant documents is exclusively 
a matter of state rule, not constitutional law. Nothing in the language of the 
Fourth Amendment, or in United States Supreme Court decisions interpreting 
that language, suggests that a probable cause statement must be recorded and 
retained by the issuing magistrate. The Fourth Amendment requires only that 
warrants be issued "upon probable cause, [be] supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons 
or tilings to be seized." U.S. Const, amend. IV; accord Delia v. United States, 441 
U.S 238, 255 (1979). These requirements "are precise and clear," Stanford v. 
Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965), and Dominguez has never argued that the 
warrant in this case failed to satisfy those requirements. See Aplt. Brf.; 
Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, *{ 17. 
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In sum, the imposition of additional warrant requirements under rule 40 
is a matter of state rule-making, not constitutional law. Accordingly, any failure 
of the magistrate in this case to comply with rule 40's retention requirement 
does not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation. The court of appeals' 
decision to the contrary should be reversed.2 
II. 
A MAGISTRATE'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE 
RETENTION REQUIREMENT OF RULE 40 OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DOES NOT REQUIRE 
EXCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE UNDER STATE LAW 
The court of appeals held that the magistrate's failure to comply with rule 
40's retention requirement also requires suppression under state law. 
Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, ^ 12-18. The court acknowledged rule 30 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and surveyed case law from other 
jurisdictions, but relied on neither in reaching its decision. See id. at ^ 12-16. 
Instead, the court construed this Court's decision in Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 
79, 149 P.3d 352, as imposing a sort of strict liability for any violation of the 
2
 Even if it could be said that a magistrate's failure to comply with rule 
40's retention requirement constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation, the law is 
well settled that "the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct 
rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates." United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984). Earlier this year, the high court reaffirmed this 
limit on the exclusionary rule's reach: "The exclusionary rule was crafted to curb 
police rather than judicial misconduct." Herring v. United States, U.S. , 129 
S.Ct. 695, 701 (2009). In this case, no one has alleged police misconduct. The 
error was that of the magistrate's and as such, suppression is not warranted. 
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retention requirement. See Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, ^ f 17. "[I]nterpret[ing] 
Anderson to mean that [this] Court intended to take a strong position on the 
issue/' the court of appeals "instructed] the trial court to grant Defendant's 
motion to suppress/' Id. Contrary to the court of appeals' holding, Anderson 
does not compel suppression and this Court should reverse. 
* * * 
In a petition for extraordinary writ, the petitioner in Anderson challenged 
the Fourth District Court's practice of not retaining copies of search warrants 
and their supporting documentation. 2006 UT 79, f^ 1. This Court concluded 
that the district court's practice was "inconsistent with . . . statutory 
requirements" and, pursuant to its supervisory authority, //require[d] that 
[magistrates] retain copies of all warrants issued and the documents supporting 
the requests for such warrants." Id. at ^ 18, 26. The Court "le[ftj to [its] rule-
making process the particular mechanisms for implementing this requirement 
and managing these records." Id. at ^ 26. The Court did not address the 
remedy to be applied in a criminal case where the magistrate fails to comply 
with the retention requirement. See id. at ^ 21-26. That remedy is found in the 
rules of criminal procedure. 
Rule 40 does not identify a remedy for violations specific to that rule. 
Accordingly, violations of the rule are subject to rule 30 of the Utah Rules of 
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Criminal Procedure. See State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258,1261-62 (Utah 1983) 
(applying rule 30 in disregarding an alleged defect in a warrant affidavit). 
Under rule 30, "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect 
the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded/7 Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). In 
other words, a violation of rule 40 does not require suppression if the error is 
harmless, i.e., if the error "is sufficiently inconsequential that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the proceedings/' State v. 
Evans, 2001 UT 22, ^ 20, 20 P.3d 888.3 
The burden of showing harm or prejudice for non-constitutional error 
rests with the defendant. See State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, % 94, 63 P.3d 731 
(holding that" [t]he burden of showing [harm] rests on the complaining party"). 
To show harm, the defendant must establish that "the error is substantial and 
prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence 
there would have been a more favorable result for the defendant." State v. 
Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah 1989). Stated another way, the defendant 
must demonstrate that but for the error, "the likelihood of a different outcome is 
If the error "results in the deprivation of a constitutional right," it will be 
disregarded only if the State can establish that the error was "harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt." State v. Calliliam, 2002 UT 86, f^ 45,55 P.3d 573. As explained 
supra, at 7-10, the magistrate's failure to retain the search warrant documents 
did not amount to constitutional error. 
sufficiently high that it undermines [the Court's] confidence in the outcome/' 
Evans, 2001 UT 22, % 20. 
As acknowledged by the court of appeals, Dominguez "has not 
challenged the warrant on probable cause grounds or otherwise contested it/7 
Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, ^ f 17. He has not claimed that the warrant lacked 
probable cause, that it was not supported by oath or affirmation, or that it did 
not otherwise meet the particularity requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 
See Aplt. Brf. at 6-13. Dominguez, therefore, does not claim and has not 
demonstrated that the magistrate's failure to comply with rule 40's retention 
requirement "had any adverse affect upon his substantial rights, nor ha[s] [he] 
shown that such failure in any way compromised the integrity of the 
documents/' Anderton, 668 P.2d at 1262. Thus, as in Anderton, the alleged rule 
violation here "constitute[s] nothing more than the failure to perform a 
ministerial act which did not affect the validity of the search warrant and the 
search conducted thereunder." Id. As such, this Court is "obliged to disregard 
the 'defect' . . . by reason of the content of Rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure." See id. at 1261-62. 
The court of appeals asserts, however, that "without a recording [in the 
possession of the magistrate], any attempt by [Dominguez] to challenge 
probable cause may require him to forfeit his Fifth Amendment right to remain 
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silent/7 Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, ^ f 17. That assertion is incorrect. The law 
is well settled that "when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to 
suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not 
thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt." Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968); accord State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ 49 
n.4, 63 P.3d 650. 
The court of appeals further opined that "the potential problems of 
mishandling or alteration" of search warrant documents also support a rule of 
strict liability. Dominguez, 2009 UT App 73, f 17. The State agrees that the best 
practice is that required under rule 40, i.e., that the magistrate make and retain a 
copy of the warrant documents at the time of issuance. However, where a 
magistrate fails to do so, per se exclusion of the State's evidence— obtained in 
good faith and consistent with this Court's preference for warrants — is a remedy 
disproportionate to the wrong. 
hi sum, failure to comply with a requirement of rule 40 that does not rise 
to a constitutional violation is subject to harmless error analysis under rule 30, as 
is any other rule violation. Dominguez has never alleged, much less shown, that 
he suffered any prejudice as a result of the magistrate's error. Even if the 
magistrate had complied with rule 40's retention requirement, the search would 
still have taken place. Therefore, the evidence should not be suppressed. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted September 11, 2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
-REY S. GRAY 
assistant Attorney GeneFal 
Counsel for Petitioner 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
William Thomas Dominguez, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
OPINION 
F^or Official Publication) 
Case No. 20070865-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 19, 2009) 
2009 UT Apr) 73 
Second District, Ogden Department, 071901654 
The Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan 
Attorneys: Randall W. Richards, Ogden, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lak£ 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Thorne, and Davis. 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge: 
tl Defendant William Thomas Dominguez was convicted of one 
count of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI), a 
third-degree felony in violation of Utah Code section 41-6a-502, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502 (2005). He asserts that the 
evidence against him should have been suppressed, contending that 
the arresting officer, Trooper Chris Turley, unlawfully obtained 
a warrant from the magistrate. Specifically, he argues that the 
magistrate's failure to comply with rule 40 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We 
agree and reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
i^2 On June 3, 2007, Trooper Turley stopped Defendant in his 
automobile at approximately 1:00 a.m. Defendant appeared to be 
racing his car against another car. While speaking to Defendant, 
Trooper Turley observed "red, bloodshot, glassy looking eyes" and 
slurred speech. Trooper Turley checked Defendant's driver 
license and discovered that it had been revoked for alcohol-
related offenses. Trooper Turley arrested Defendant and, during 
the arrest, smelled alcohol on Defendant's breath. Trooper 
Turley asked Defendant to submit to breathalyzer and field 
sobriety tests, but Defendant refused. 
f3 After taking Defendant to the police station, Trooper Turley 
prepared a written affidavit in support of a search warrant 
authorizing a blood draw. He then telephoned Judge Brent West. 
Judge West placed Trooper Turley under oath, after which the 
officer told Judge West "the subject's name, the reason for the 
stop, [and] all of the clues [he] observed." Trooper Turley read 
significant portions of his written affidavit to Judge West but 
did not read every line. After hearing Trooper Turley's 
statement, Judge West directed Trooper Turley to sign the 
affidavit with his own name and also to sign Judge West's name. 
Trooper Turley followed these directions. The telephone 
conference was not otherwise recorded. 
1[4 Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of 
alcohol, driving with alcohol in his body with a no-alcohol 
license, driving on a revoked license, driving a vehicle without 
proof of insurance, and engaging in a speed contest or 
exhibition. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, 
arguing that the warrant had not been obtained according to the 
proper procedures. Defendant did not challenge the probable 
cause element. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Trooper 
Turley testified, but the magistrate did not. Trooper Turley 
described his telephone conversation with Judge West but not the 
circumstances leading to Defendant's arrest. The motion to 
suppress was denied by the court. Defendant then entered a 
conditional guilty plea to driving under the influence and 
driving without proof of insurance. Defendant now appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
%5 Defendant asks us to consider whether the trial court erred 
in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result 
of the search warrant. Defendant argues that the telephonic 
warrant did not comply with rule 4 0 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and that this alleged violation merits suppression of 
the evidence. We examine first whether there was an error and, 
second, whether the error caused harm sufficient to merit 
suppressing the evidence. The analysis and required application 
of this rule is a matter of first impression. We review the 
trial court's interpretation of a rule of procedure for 




I. The Telephonic Warrant Did Not Comply with Rule 40 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
f6 Defendant argues that the procedure followed by Trooper 
Turley and the magistrate violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, see 
U.S. Const, amend. IV, asserting that it did not comply with the 
requirements of rule 4 0 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
The relevant part of rule 4 0 states: 
At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall 
retain and seal a copy of the search warrant, 
the application and all affidavits or other 
recorded testimony on which the warrant is 
based and shall, within a reasonable time, 
file those sealed documents in court files 
which are secured against access by the 
public. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 40(i) (l).1 Defendant contends that, in issuing 
the warrant telephonically, the magistrate failed to retain, 
seal, or file the documents, insisting that it must be the 
magistrate, not the officer, who complies with rule 40's 
requirements. 
\l Rule 40 (i) (1) was implemented in response to recent guidance 
from the Utah Supreme Court. See id. R. 40 (i) (1) Advisory 
Committee Notes (" (i) Subsection (1) is added in compliance with 
the order of the Utah Supreme Court in Anderson v. Taylor, 2 0 06 
UT 79 (filed December 5, 2006)."). 
1[8 In Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79, 149 P.3d 352, the Utah 
Supreme Court reviewed the Fourth District Court's customary 
procedures for issuing search warrants. See id. |^ 1. The Fourth 
District Court did not retain copies of search warrants or their 
supporting documentation. See id. \ 2. Instead, 
after issuing a warrant, the issuing 
magistrate return[ed] both the warrant and 
the supporting material to the law 
enforcement officer seeking the warrant. 
1. "'Recorded' or 'recording' includes the original recording of 
testimony, a return or other communication or any copy, printout, 
facsimile, or other replication that is intended by the person 
making the recording to have the same effect as the original." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 40(a)(2). 
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After the warrant [wa]s executed, the officer 
deliver [ed] the original warrant, the 
supporting material, the return, and the 
inventory of items seized in the search to 
the magistrate, who then review[ed] it and 
either fil [ed] it with the court or 
return[ed] it to law enforcement with a 
request that law enforcement file it with the 
court. 
Id. % 2. The supreme court invalidated this practice. See id, 
f 26. We quote liberally: 
Giving law enforcement sole custody of all 
affidavits and warrants up through the point 
where the warrant has been executed and a 
return filed is inherently problematic for at 
least two reasons. First, it leaves the 
court without any record of the [warrant] or 
the materials supporting its issuance until 
after the [warrant] is executed and a return 
filed. Second, it allows for the possibility 
that affidavits and other court records may 
be mishandled or even altered without 
detection. When the records upon which the 
magistrate acts in issuing a warrant are 
handled by persons other than court personnel 
prior to being filed with the court, the 
court has no basis for confidence in the 
accuracy, authenticity, or completeness of 
those documents. In the matter of warrants 
for the search and seizure of persons or 
property, more is required. We accordingly 
require that magistrates issuing search 
warrants retain in their custody copies 
all search warrants issued, as well 
material supporting s 
applications, rather 
enforcement the only 
search warrant 
than surrender: 








To ensure the integrity of our court 
records, we have concluded that the courts of 
this state must retain copies of all search 
warrants and supporting material. 
Id. \^ 22-23 (emphasis added). The supreme court indicated that 
it did not have the authority "to prescribe the particular 
procedures to be followed in maintaining and disclosing' such 
records" but instructed the appropriate body to do so. Id. % 23. 
Rule 40 (i) was adopted in response and became effective April 30, 
2007. See Utah R. Crim. P. 40 (i) (1) Advisory Committee Note (i). 
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^9 The State attempts to distinguish Anderson by pointing out 
that Anderson did not involve a telephonic warrant and that in 
the context of a telephone request for a warrant, the court 
cannot "retain" what it never had. Section (1) of rule 40 allows 
a peace officer to obtain a search warrant remotely, i.e., 
telephonically, including entering the magistrate's signature, if 
so directed by the magistrate. See Utah R. Crim. P. 40(1) (1), 
(4). That section further states that n[t]he testimony and 
content of the warrant shall be recorded . . . by writing or by 
mechanical, magnetic, electronic, photographic storage or by 
other means." Id. R. 40(1) (2) . Although the rule does not 
specify by whom the recording must be made, the State suggests 
that this can be accomplished by the peace officer. However, 
subsection (1) (5) requires compliance with section (i) : "[t] he 
warrant and recorded testimony shall be retained by and filed 
with the court pursuant to Section (i), " id. R. 40(1) (5), which 
assigns that responsibility to the magistrate, see id. R. 40(i) . 
Subsection (1)(5) was also amended in response to Anderson. 
Compare id^ R. 40(1) (2008) with id. (2006). 
IflO Although it is not controlling, the corresponding federal 
rule offers insight as to how these sections might co-exist. 
Rule 41(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires 
that a magistrate judge, issuing a warrant by telephone, must 
"make a verbatim record of the conversation with a suitable 
recording device, if available, or by a court reporter, or in 
writing." Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(d)(3)(B)(ii). Federal rule 
41(e)(3) further requires that the applicant for a search warrant 
"must prepare a 'proposed duplicate original warrant' and must 
read or otherwise transmit the contents of that document verbatim 
to the magistrate judge," and "the magistrate judge must enter 
those contents into an original warrant." Id. R. 41(e) (3) (A) , 
(B) . 
^11 Because the language at issue was added in direct response 
to the Utah Supreme Court's desire to ensure "that the issuing 
court will maintain reliable records of the warrants and the 
documents supporting them," Anderson, 2006 UT 79, f 26, and since 
the federal rules explicitly outline a method whereby this may be 
accomplished in securing a telephonic warrant, see Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 41, we conclude that rule 40 (i) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure requires the magistrate to make and keep a copy of the 
search warrant and supporting documents; it is not sufficient for 
the peace officer alone to retain this information and 
subsequently supply it to the court. Accordingly, the warrant at 
issue in this case did not comply with rule 40 of the Utah Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. 
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II. Reversible Error 
f12 We now consider whether this violation merited suppressing 
the evidence. Under rule 3 0 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, n[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which 
does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be 
disregarded." Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a). Indeed, the State argues 
that the violation here "constituted nothing more than the 
failure to perform a ministerial act which did not affect the 
validity of the search warrant and the search conducted 
thereunder," see State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 
1983) . 
Hl3 Federal circuits applying rule 4" 'c) of the Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure and state courts a plying rules similar to 
that rule have addressed whether evidence obtained pursuant to 
warrants issued in violation of federal rule 41(c) should be 
excluded on a case-by-case basis. For example, in United States 
v. Rome, 809 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1987), the peace officer and the 
magistrate had several telephone conversations during the course 
of an afternoon and evening. See id. at 666. Only the last of 
these conversations, the one in which the search warrant was 
actually issued, was recorded or retained. See id. at 665-66. 
The Rome court determined that the error was not sufficient to 
justify excluding the evidence obtained via the search warrant, 
embracing a standard written by the Ninth Circuit: 
"Unless there is a clear constitutional 
violation, non-compliance with Rule 41 [of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] 
requires suppression of evidence only where 
(1) there was 'prejudice1 in the sense that 
the search might not have occurred or would 
not have been so abrasive if the rule had 
been followed, or (2) there is evidence of 
intentional and deliberate disregard of a 
provision in the rule." 
Id. at 669 (quoting United States v. Stefanson, 648 F.2d 1231, 
1235 (9th Cir. 1980)). The Rome court determined that "[t]here 
[was] nothing in the record to suggest that Rome's Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated [because] [p]robable cause was 
amply demonstrated in the recorded testimony upon which the 
search warrant was based." Id. at 670. The court did, however, 
offer this warning: 
We do not condone careless police work and 
lack of preparation, nor do we hold that the 
failure to understand the rules governing 
their conduct will excuse law enforcement 
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officers from compliance therewith. We 
simply hold that m this case, [the peace 
officer and magistrate] complied with the 
spirit, if not the letter, of Rule 41(c) (2) 
Id. 
^14 Similarly, m United States v. Chaar, 137 F.3d 359 (6th Cir. 
1998), the Sixth Circuit ruled that a violation of rule 41 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not affect the 
admissibility of evidence. See id. at 365. The court there 
considered federal rule 41(c)(2)(d), which, at the time, required 
that the magistrate record a telephone call for a search warrant, 
either by voice recording, stenographic, or longhand verbatim. 
See Fed. R. Cnm. P. 41(c)(2)(d) (1993) (amended 2002). In that 
case, a tape recording was made of the telephone conversation m 
which the magistrate authorized the search warrant, but the tape 
was subsequently lost. See Chaar, 137 F.3d at 360-61. Nineteen 
months later, the investigating agent provided an affidavit 
recalling the facts. Id. at 360 n.l, 366. In determining that 
the error did not merit reversal, the Chaar court noted that 
"there was significant evidence supporting probable cause m this 
case." Id. at 364. The court relied on United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, for the "good faith exception" to search warrant 
requirements. See Chaar, 137 F.3d at 364. The Sixth Circuit has 
summarized Leon as follows: 
"The exclusionary rule should be modified so 
as not to bar the admission of evidence 
seized m reasonable, good-faith reliance on 
a search warrant that is subsequently held to 
be defective. 
[Leon] noted four specific situations where 
the good faith reliance exception would not 
apply: (1) where the supporting affidavit 
contained knowing or reckless falsity; (2) 
where the issuing magistrate failed to act m 
a neutral and detached fashion, and served 
merely as a rubber stamp for the police; (3) 
where the supporting affidavit did not 
provide the magistrate with a substantial 
basis for determining the existence of 
probable cause, or ±n other words, where the 
warrant application was supported by 
[nothing] more than a 'bare bones' affidavit; 
and (4) where the officer's reliance on the 
warrant was neither m good faith nor 
objectively reasonable. 
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Id. (emphasis and alterations in original) (quoting United States 
v. Leake, 998 F.2d 1359, 1366 (6th Cir. 1993)). The Sixth 
Circuit's stated policy was that "'[t]he exclusionary rule is 
designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the 
errors of judges and magistrates.' We do not exclude evidence, 
absent constitutional violations, unless the exclusion furthers 
the purpose of the exclusionary rule." Id. at 361 (additional 
citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
916). But see Chaar, 137 F.3d at 366 (Dowd, J., dissenting) 
(finding the violation "to be more than a mere 'technical1 
violation" because "the only evidence of the conversation 
presented to the district court at the suppression hearing was 
the affidavit of the affiant, executed nineteen months after the 
issuance of the warrant" and there was no testimony whatsoever by 
the magistrate judge). 
Kl5 By contrast, in State v. Cook, 498 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1993), 
the Minnesota Supreme Court excluded evidence based on a 
violation of the search warrant rule. See id. at 22. Minnesota 
followed the federal rules for securing telephonic search 
warrants. See id. at 19. Although the magistrate authorized the 
warrant by phone, "[the] telephone conversation was not recorded. 
The officer did not read his statement from a prepared written 
application or from any notes, nor, apparently, did the judge 
make any significant notes of what was said over the telephone." 
Id. at 19. The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the 
warrant was not valid, stating, 
The purpose of these procedures is to 
have a record made contemporaneously with the 
authorization of the search warrant that will 
show both probable cause for a search and a 
reasonable need for the warrant to be issued 
telephonically, so that later, if need be, 
there is a basis for challenging the warrant 
that is nor: dependent solely on after-the-
fact recollections. 
Id. at 20. The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions that 
the evidence must be suppressed. Id. at 18. 
%1S Similarly, in Volz v. State, 773 N.E.2d 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2 002), the Indiana Court of Appeals invalidated a search warrant 
that had been recorded on a faulty tape recorder when the 
recorder did not record the entire conversation. See id. at 8 96-
97. The Indiana statute in effect required that a magistrate 
issuing a telephonic search warrant "shall record the 
conversation on audio tape and order the court reporter to type 
or transcribe the recording for entry in the record." See Ind. 
Code Ann. § 35-33-5-8 (b) (LexisNexis 1990). After learning that 
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their telephone conversation had not been recorded, the peace 
officer and magistrate testified at a hearing to reconstruct 
their conversation. See Volz, 773 N.E.2d at 896. The court held 
this was not sufficient because without a recording, "neither the 
validity of the warrant nor [the officer's] reasonable belief 
that the warrant was valid is capable of independent verification 
through judicial review." Id. at 899. Accordingly, the court 
reversed the matter and instructed the trial court to grant the 
defendant's motion to suppress. See id. 
fl7 Because this is an issue of first impression, we are left to 
decide for the first time how strictly rule 40 should be enforced 
in Utah. Although we recognize that Defendant has not challenged 
the warrant on probable cause grounds or otherwise contested it,2 
we take Anderson's mandate seriously. Indeed, without a 
recording, any attempt by Defendant to challenge probable cause 
may require him to forfeit his Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent:. We assume that the Utah Supreme Court wishes this rule 
to be followed strictly now that it has been implemented. 
Anderson offered clear public policy support for its mandate, and 
the result of the Fourth District Court's procedure had no 
different effect than the result here. Similarly, the potential 
problems of mishandling or alteration identified in Anderson also 
exist in telephonic warrant requests. We interpret Anderson to 
mean that the Utah Supreme Court intended to take a strong 
position on the issue. Thus, rule 40 is unambiguous in setting 
forth the courts' responsibility when issuing search warrants, 
including those sought telephonically. Accordingly, we reverse 
and instruct the trial court to grant Defendant's motion to 
suppress .3 
CONCLUSION 
^18 Rule 40 (i) (1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
requires that magistrates, not solely peace officers, "retain and 
seal a copy of the search warrant, the application and all 
affidavits or other recorded testimony on which the warrant is 
based," Utah R. Crim. P. 40 (i) (1) . The magistrate in this case 
2. Defendant does not argue that the officer's reading of only 
portions of his affidavit to the magistrate invalidated the 
search warrant. We, however, believe that selective 
communication of the affidavit may be problematic. 
3. We note that there may be sufficient evidence without the 
excluded results of the blood draw to nevertheless support a 
conviction. 
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did not do so. We conclude this was reversible error and reverse 
and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
^19 WE CONCUR: 
William A. Thorne Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
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ADDENDUM B 
U.S. Const, amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Wairants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
Rule 30. Errors and Defects. 
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. 
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and 
errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the 
court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order. 
Rule 40. Search Warrants. 
(a) Definitions. 
As used in this rule: 
(a)(1) "Daytime" means the hours beginning at 6 a.m. and ending at 10 p.m. 
local time. 
(a)(2) "Recorded" or "recording" includes the original recording of testimony, 
a return or other communication or any copy, printout, facsimile, or other 
replication that is intended by the person making the recording to have the same 
effect as the original. 
(a)(3) "Search warrant" is an order issued by a magistrate in the name of the 
state and directed to a peace officer, describing with particularity the thing, place, 
or person to be searched and the property or evidence to be seized and includes an 
original written or recorded warrant or any copy, printout, facsimile or other 
replica intended by the magistrate issuing the warrant to have the same effect as 
the original. 
(b) Grounds for issuance. 
Property or evidence may be seized pursuant to a search warrant if there is 
probable cause to believe it: 
(b)(1) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(b)(2) has been used or is possessed for the purpose of being used to commit or 
conceal the commission of an offense; or 
(b)(3) is evidence of illegal conduct. 
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(c) Conditions precedent to issuance. 
(c)(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and shall particularly describe the person or place to be 
searched and the person, property, or evidence to be seized. 
(c)(2) If the item sought to be seized is evidence of illegal conduct, and is in 
the possession of a person or entity for which there is insufficient probable cause 
shown to the magistrate to believe that such person or entity is a party to the 
alleged illegal conduct, no search warrant shall issue except upon a finding by the 
magistrate that the evidence sought to be seized cannot be obtained by subpoena, 
or that such evidence would be concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered if 
sought by subpoena. If such a finding is made and a search warrant issued, the 
magistrate shall direct upon the warrant such conditions that reasonably afford 
protection of the following interests of the person or entity in possession of such 
evidence: 
(c)(2)(A) protection against unreasonable interference with normal business; 
(c)(2)(B) protection against the loss or disclosure of protected confidential 
sources of information; or 
(c)(2)(C) protection against prior or direct restraints on constitutionally 
protected rights. 
(d) Search warrant sewed in readable form. 
A copy of a search warrant shall be served in a readable form upon the person 
or place to be searched. 
(e) Time for senice—Officer may request assistance. 
(e)(1) The magistrate shall insert a direction in the warrant that it be served in 
the daytime, unless the affidavit or recorded testimony states sufficient grounds to 
believe a search is necessaiy in the night to seize the property prior to its being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged, altered, or for other good reason; in which case 
the magistrate may insert a direction that it be served any time of the day or night. 
(e)(2) The search warrant shall be served within ten days from the date of 
issuance. Any search warrant not executed within this time shall be void and shall 
be returned to the court or magistrate as not executed. 
(e)(3) An officer may request other persons to assist in conducting the search. 
(f) Receipt for property taken. 
The officer, when seizing property pursuant to a search warrant, shall give a 
receipt to the person from whom it was seized or in whose possession it was 
found. If no person is present, the officer shall leave the receipt in the place where 
the property was found. 
B-2 
(g) Return—Inventory of property taken. 
The officer, after execution of the warrant, shall promptly make a signed return 
of the warrant to a magistrate of the issuing court and deliver a written or recorded 
inventory of anything seized, stating the place where it is being held. 
(h) Safekeeping of property. 
The officer seizing the property shall be responsible for its safekeeping and 
maintenance until the court otherwise orders. 
(i) Magistrate to retain and file copies—Documents sealed for twenty days— 
Forwarding of record to court with jurisdiction. 
(i)(l) At the time of issuance, the magistrate shall retain and seal a copy of the 
search warrant, the application and all affidavits or other recorded testimony on 
which the warrant is based and shall, within a reasonable time, file those sealed 
documents in court files which are secured against access by the public. Those 
documents shall remain sealed until twenty days following the issuance of the 
warrant unless that time is extended or reduced under Section (m). Unsealed 
search warrant documents shall be filed in the court record available to the public. 
(i)(2) Sealing and retention of the file may be accomplished by: 
(i)(2)(A) placing paper documents or storage media in a sealed envelope and 
filing the sealed envelope in a court file not available to the public; 
(i)(2)(B) storing the documents by electronic or other means under the control 
of the court in a manner reasonably designed to preserve the integrity of the 
documents and protect them against disclosure to the public during the period in 
which they are sealed; or 
(i)(2)(C) filing through the use of an electronic filing system operated by the 
State of Utah which system is designed to transmit accurate copies of the 
documents to the court file without allowing alteration to the documents after 
issuance of the warrant by the magistrate. 
(j) Findings required for sennce without notice. 
If the magistrate finds upon proof, under oath, that the object of the search may 
be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that physical harm may result to 
any person if notice were given, the magistrate may direct that the officer need not 
give notice of authority and purpose before entering the premises to be searched. 
(k) Violation of health, safety, building, or animal cruelty laws or ordinances-
Warrant to obtain evidence. 
In addition to other warrants provided by this rule, a magistrate, upon a 
showing of probable cause to believe a state, county, or city law or ordinance, has 
been violated in relation to health, safety, building, or animal cruelty, may issue a 
warrant for the puipose of obtaining evidence of a violation. A warrant may be 
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obtained from a magistrate upon request of a peace officer or state, county, or 
municipal health, fire, building, or animal control official only after approval by a 
prosecuting attorney. A search warrant issued under this section shall be directed 
to any peace officer within the county where the warrant is to be executed, who 
shall serve the warrant. Other concerned personnel may accompany the officer. 
(I) Remotely communicated search warrants. 
(/)(1) Means of communication. When reasonable under the circumstances, a 
search warrant may be issued upon sworn or affirmed testimony of a person who 
is not in the physical presence of the magistrate, provided the magistrate is 
satisfied that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. All 
communication between the magistrate and the peace officer or prosecuting 
attorney requesting the warrant may be remotely transmitted by voice, image, text, 
or any combination of those, or by other means. 
(/)(2) Communication to be recorded. All testimony upon which the magistrate 
relies for a finding of probable cause shall be on oath or affirmation. The 
testimony and content of the wan-ant shall be recorded. Recording shall be by 
writing or by mechanical, magnetic, electronic, photographic storage or by other 
means. 
(0(3) Issuance. If the magistrate finds that probable cause is shown, the 
magistrate shall issue a search warrant. 
(0(4) Signing warrant. Upon approval, the magistrate may direct the peace 
officer or the prosecuting attorney requesting a warrant from a remote location to 
sign the magistrate's name on a warrant at a remote location. 
(0(5) Filing of warrant and testimony. The warrant and recorded testimony 
shall be retained by and filed with the court pursuant to Section (i). Filing may be 
by writing or by mechanical, magnetic, electronic, photographic storage or by 
other means. 
(0(6) Usable copies made available. Except as provided in Sections (i) and (m) 
of this rule, any person having standing may request and shall be provided with a 
copy of the warrant and a copy of the recorded testimony submitted in support of 
the application for the warrant. The copies shall be provided in a reasonably usable 
form. 
(m) Sealing and Unsealing of Search Warrant Documents. 
(m)(l) Application for sealing of documents related to search warrants. A 
prosecutor or peace officer may make a written or otherwise recorded application 
to the court to have documents or records related to search warrants sealed for a 
time in addition to the sealing required by Subsection (i)(l). Upon a showing of 
good cause, the court may order the following documents to be sealed: 
(m)(l)(A) applications for search warrants; 
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(m)(l)(B) search warrants; 
(m)(l)(C) affidavits or other recorded testimony upon which the search warrant 
is based; 
(m)(l)(D) the application, affidavits or other recorded testimony and order for 
sealing the documents. 
(m)(2) Sealing of search warrant documents. Search warrant documents are 
public record that may be sealed in entirety or in part and not placed in the public 
file if all or part of the information in them would: 
(m)(2)(A) cause a substantial risk of harm to a person's safety; 
(m)(2)(B) pose a clearly unwarranted invasion of or harm to a person's 
reputation or privacy; or 
(m)(2)(C) pose a serious impediment to the investigation. 
Sealed documents shall be maintained in a file not available to the public. If a 
document is not sealed in its entirety, the court may order a copy of the document 
with the sealed portions redacted to be placed in the public file and an un-redacted 
copy to be placed in the sealed file. Except as required by Section (i), no document 
may be designated as "Filed under Seal" or "Confidential" unless it is 
accompanied by a court order sealing the document. 
(m)(3) Unsealing of documents. Any person having standing may file a motion 
to unseal search warrant documents with notice to the prosecutor and law 
enforcement agency. If the prosecutor or law enforcement agency files an 
appropriate and timely objection to the unsealing, the court may hold a hearing on 
the motion and objection. Where no objection to unsealing the documents is filed, 
the defendant may prepare an order for entry by the court. The court may order the 
unsealing of the documents or order copies of the documents to be delivered to a 
designated person without unsealing the documents and require the person 
receiving the documents not to disclose the contents to any other person without 
the authorization of the court. 
(m)(4) Length of time documents may remain sealed. The documents may 
remain sealed until the court finds, for good cause, that the records should be 
unsealed. 
[Approved effective May 2. 2005; amended effective April 30, 2007.] 
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Advisory Committee Notes 
(a) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-201 Utah Code Ann. 
(b) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-202 Utah Code Ann. 
(c) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-203 Utah Code Ann. 
(d) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-204 Utah Code Ann. 
(e) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-205 Utah Code Ann. 
(f) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-206 Utah Code Ann. The statute 
contained the words "Failure to give oi ave a receipt does not render the evidence seized 
inadmissible at trial." This rule is not a departure from that original legislative intent. While the 
committee did not consider it necessary to address admissibility in a procedural rule, the 
elimination of that language does not suggest that failure to comply with the receipt requirement 
should be a basis for exclusion of the evidence seized. 
(g) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-207 Utah Code Ann. 
(h) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-208 Utah Code Ann. 
(i) Subsection (1) is added in compliance with the order of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79. Subsection (2) is added to allow for a planned electronic search 
warrant system operated by the Utah Bureau Of Criminal Identification, or other systems which 
might be employed by a magistrate. This provision supercedes the supervisory orders of the Court 
in Anderson v. Taylor for that purpose. 
(j) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-210(2) Utah Code .Ann. 
(k) This section is adapted from former Sec. 77-23-211 Utah Code .Ann. 
(1) This section was formerly Rule 40 Remotely Communicated Search Warrants. Terms used 
are intended to be interpreted liberally in order to facilitate remote communications as a means of 
applying for and issuing search warrants while at the same time preserving the integrity of the 
probable cause application and the terms of warrants that are authorized. 
(m) (New section) 
Cross References 




SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
The undersigned being first duly sworn, deposes and sa}^: 
That the Amant has reason to believe that William Thomas Domingacz possessed 
and/or used drags and for alcohol 
On the psrsonfs) of: William Domfngtiez 
In the City of Ogdsn, County of Weber, State of Utah, there is now certain property or 
evidence described as: 
Blood belonging to William Thomas Dommgucz, Your Affiant believes William Thomas Dornbgusz's 
blood contains evidence of driving under £hc kfiueace of alcohol end/or drugs in "violation of Utah Coit 
Arm. section 41~6a-5D2. 
Your Afnaitf believes the blood coirisins the following substance: 
* Drugs 
* and/or Aloohol 
Thst said property or evidence: 
Is evidence of illega] conduct. 
ArrlAHT STATEMENT: 
Affiant is Trooper Chris Turlsy, a Police Officer witii the Utah Highway Pcxrol, and bang duly sworn, 
deposes 2nd states that 
Affiant has boon a Peace Officer for nearly two years crjirsridy serving as a State Troopsr -with, the Utah 
Highway Parol, I have been trained in detecting and arresting alcohol and drug nnpairsd drivers. I have 
received training in Standard Field Sobriety Tests znd is currently ccrdtbd to opsrals the Inroxilyser. I 
regularly ccmc in contact "with, people who are under the influence of alcohol and/or dings while cmt on 
patrol, Curn^yIhavc£n,cst^appiwdin2tcly50DUI*s. 
The facts establishing the grounds for issuance of a search warrsat arc: 
On June 3rd 2007, at 2ppraadnxs2+s$y 0102 hours, I observed a red Honda Civic driving southbound on Washingtcni 
Boulsvsrd ct 2400 South hi lane 1 racing a silver passenger car. The vehicle was stopped by the scdvsaoa of 
- 1 -
07/17/2007 14:30 FAX g}013 
my emergency lights. I approached the vehicle 2nd William Domingusz was is the driver ssztnof waging a ssst 
belt. Domingucz had red, bloodshot, glassy looking eyes. As I spoke "with Domingusz, I noticed that hrs speech 
was noticeably slurred. I conducted a records check on Domingusz using his name End date of birtL Tnis 
infarmarion revealed that Domingusz had a aloohol revoked license 2nd was an alcohol restricted drivsr. 
Domingusz denied consuming say aicohoL I placed Domingusz under CTest and could smell 2. strong odor of 
sn alcohol beverage coming from his breath in the open air, 
I requested Domingusz blow into a portable breath tester, however he refused to blow, When asked if be would 
allow me to conduct field sobriety test, Domingusz said no and that he had been through this bsibre. Domingucz 
refused to submit to any DUI field sobriety tests. I read Domingusz his DUI admonitions advising him of the 
constqueaces of not submitting to my tests. Domingusz still would not cooperate sua refused to give & chemical 
test 
Domingusz has at least 4 prior DUI convictions in the past 10 years and be is currently on parole for a felony 
DUI conviction. 
WHEREFORE, the Affiant prays that the search warrant be issued for the ssizmre of said items fit any time any 
or night due to the following reasons: 
It is currerdy nighttime, and there is a need to rsrve the warrant before daylight to secure important 
evidence in this esse prior to it dissipating from his/her system. 
• It is currently nighttime, end the suspect is currently in custody awaiting Eiithorizsdon ircm the court to 
obtain his/her blood. 
It is farther requested thst the omesr exectmng the warrant use a reasonable amount of force to obtain the 
sample. 
William Domingusz has refused to submit to E chemical test He may resist having his blood drawn, 
therefore, ir inny be necessary TO restrain him while the biood is being drawn. 
SaCX3NELEiISTPJCT COURT JUDGE 
U7/17/2007 14:30 Fi-I El 014 
EXHIBIT 2 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
"^IZJSEH^WXKSAKT' 
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Proof by affidavit under cafe hsving been made this day before me, Judge Brent West, I sm satisfied fesfc 
there is probable cause to belisvs that; 
Qnfhe persQn(s) of. 
In tire City of OgdeiL County of Weber, State of Utah, fher& h now certain property or evidence described 
as; 
Blood belonging to William Thomas Doraixigfcez bom 5-20-S2 
That oantdns the following substance: 
• Alcohol snd/or Drugs 
Tnst said property or evidence: 
h evidence of illegal conduct 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED 
Al anytime, dz\r or night 
To msks a search of the above named or described persaafs) tor fee herein shove described property or 
evidence, aid if you find fee same, or cay psit thereof to bring it farthwife before me at fee Second Judicial 
District Court, Weber County, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody subject to tks order of 
mis court This court authorizes fee ornbsr to ETCT^* for fee retention of feis evidence, 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWOEN TO BEFORE ME 
ThisSrd day of June 2007, 
024 
143015 
SECOND JUBICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RETURN OF SEARCH WARRANT 
NO: 
The evidsncs listed below was taken from the person of William Thomas Datningucz 
1. Blood which is bsiievsd to contain alcohol above the I&gal limit of .08 and/or drugs to 
rmasr him acarrabfe of ssfsly opcrsdng a motor vshicb. 
By virtue of a sesrdi warrant, ckt&d fbz 3rd dsy of Jims, 2007, snd issued by Judge Brsnt 
West of the abovs-snrillad court 
I* Troopsr Chris Turisy whom this warrant was executed by, do swear fast foe blood 
listed above, was taken at my dirscdcjn, undcx sntkrify of ihs wEisnl issued by Judgs 
Brsnt West, on June 3rf, 2037 
The sviebnee that WES takai by virtue of said warrant will be regained in my custody, and 
sent to fee lab for analysis, 2nd will bz subject to the order of this court, or sny other 
court, which may have jtmsdicdon ovar this evident. 
AFFIANT 
Subscribed and sworn to tefore me, this _ day of June, 2007. 
Si, 
SECOND DISTPJCT CCpRT JUDG2 
ft?S 
ADDENDUM D 
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051 
TEE COURT: Okay. This is State of Utah versus 


















I defendant, Wi 
1 We' 11 sJ 
that. 
the sea. 






SHAW: We call Trooper Turley to 
CHRIS TURLEY, 
>ing first duly sworn, was examine 




er, please state your full name and 
Turley. ITm a state trooper wit 
1. 
ow long have you been so employed 
a little over two years now. 
ou have occasion to come into con 
H i am Thomas Dominguez, on June 3 
GRAVIS: We'll stipulate to that, 
te that he arrested him for a OUI 
SHAW: Okay. 
GRAVIS: I don't think we need to 
SHAW: Okay. We'll get right to 
rch warrant. There came a rime during 
est wr 
[ test, or othe 
A. That' 
.ere Mr. Dominguez refused to take 






















Q. And what did you do in response to that? 
A. At that tirre I wrote a search warrant. I contacted 
Judge West by telephone. 
Q. And when you say you wrote a search warrant; did you 
write the warrant prior to contacting -- an affidavit for the 
warrant prior to contacting Judge West? 
A. Thau's correct. 
Q. And where did you do that? 
A. At my office. 
Q. Okay. The defendant, then, was still with you and 
present at the time you were preparing the warrant, or 
affidavit for warrant? 
A. Yes. He was under supervision at the office. 
MR. SHAW: Your Honor, we have -- I suppose there's 
a stipulation that the affidavit is accurate as reflected in 
the memorandum? 
MR. GRAVIS: I stipulate that that's the affidavit 
the officer prepared, but no: that that's what was rold to 
Judge West. 
MR. SHAW: Okay. That's fine. 
Q. (3X MR. SHAir) So you prepared an affidavit and you 
contacted Judge West telephonically? 
A. Correct. 
Q. Tell us about the telephone conversation. What did 
you inform Judge West of during one telephone conversation? 
3 
A. I informed him of the subject's name, the reason for 
the stop, all of the clues I observed as far as his red blood 
shot eyesf the smell of the odor of alcohol, the subject's 
unwillingness to submit to a chemical test. 
Q. Do you have a copy of the affidavit for search 
warrant? 
A. I do. 
Q. Look at that with me, if you will. Let's just go 
through it if we night for a moment line item by line item. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your Honor, we'll submit that the 
affidavit can be entered so we don't have to go through all 
of it. If the state wants to submit the affidavit, it speaks 
for itself. 
MR. SHAW: Okay. 
MR. GRAVIS: At least the alleged affidavit, let's 
make it that way. 
MR. SHAW: Okay. That's fine. 
Q. (3Y MR. SHAW) What I'm getting at, trooper, is did 
you in fact read part or all of this affidavit to Judge West 
while you had him on the telephone? 
A. Umm, I did not read him every line of this affidavit. 
I stated the facts to him. I did state all of the facts that 
are in this affidavit as far as the reason for the stop, the 
reason for wanting to obtain a warrant. 
O. Are you able, looking at the affidavit, to tell us 
4 
^ 1 1 r / t c 
"uccre on t h e t e l e o h o n e ? 
• -TJII, hi:n one reason f o r the s t c p , which is o n 
on.e 11rsz race at on.e b o 11 om. 
Q , S o ar t ing v;i th on June 3rd, 2007, 
" =: ? 
approximately 
0. Oka v. 
:ea A. Continuing all the way ohrougn wrier-
Domincruez T s blood - - -. " ~rtable blood tester i .r i i ie ref; ised 
I also informed him that Dominguez had a 
DUI convictions :.o the past ten years. And that he was on 
parole for a felony DUI conviction. 
Q. Okay. And then, prior to you reading than portion 
;est, were you placed under oath by Judge West? 
X W - 5 
Q. Okay. And at the conclusion of the affidavit, or at 
least your statement to the judge, which included part of th~ 
affidavit, whan did Judge West direct you to do? 
A. Umin, he advised me to affix a signature to the 
affidavit, 
Q. And was that done in accordance with the judge's 










I A . 








Okay. And then did 
est directing you to 
I did not. 
When did you sign th 
When he told me to. 
Okay. That's what I 
you went ahead and s 
That's correct. 
In its current form? 
Correct. 
And then looking at 
you sign the 
sign his name 
e affidavit? 
fm saying, wh 
igned the aff 
the search wa 












Okay. And then ulti] 
wherein you returned 
ently signed, it look 
Was there any other 
ne conference between 
tire process? 
No. 
KB. HU3IS: Okay. 
MR. GRAVIS: I have 
TEE COURT: You may 
mately there 
the warrant. 
s like, June 













































., i you want to a roue 
:>ncr :ne a r aliment t h a t 
jonvers a r* c ;=, *~ -| 
somewhat modified the previous statute as I read it and 
defines recording to include a written :•=.--< ! 
Trooper Turley has a written record that was 
ed simultaneously with his conversation with Judge 
11 j oontained in that affidavit to Judge west. Judge West 
iCted him, u: " n + ; - " n" ". c. J "i * -. 'iz name 
13 | to the warrant. That warrant was then issued. 
I want to be specific about this, because I -"---".-
*; .' ! defines recorded or recording as including the 
16 j "recording of testimony, a return or other communication or 
17 i : ; _ . . .. ._ - . : ther replication that is 
intended by the person making the recording to have the same 
effect as the original." ~ ~ ' written docurne: 11 Troop e • r 
Turley followed that document during his conversation. 
Then, if you look at rule 40(1) (-2), the recording of 
t e s t i in o i : y .: s s u f f i c i e: 11 :i f i n written f o rm. That's what the 
affidavit is. It was substantially complied with .in 
accordance with rr ::] e 4 0 a i i d we thin k :i ::'" s a v a I i d warrant. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Go ahead. 
7 
MR. GRAVIS: Well, Your Honor, I agree that rule 4 0 
has replaced the statute, but the stare is skipping over rule 
i(l), which says that — 
TH3 COURT: Let me get it out. Hold on a second. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
IK'S COURT: And you were looking at what? 
MR. GRAVIS: 4 0 (i) (1) . 
TFJ& COURT: You know, I guess I have my 2 007 book in 
my office. I thought I had one out here, but I don't seem 
to. Why don't you read it to me. 
MR. GRAVIS: "At the time of issuance, the 
magistrate shall retain and seal a copy of the search 
warrant, the application and all affidavits or other recorded 
testimony on which the warrant is based, and shall, within a 
reasonable time, file these sealed documents in court files 
which are secured against access by the public. Those 
documents shall remain sealed until 20 days following the 
issuance of the warrant unless that time is extended or 
reduced under section M. Unsealed search warrant documents 
shall be filed in the court record available to the public." 
So I submit that rule (i)(1) requires that that record be 
prepared by the magistrate, not by the officer. There's no 
evidence that any recording of the testimony of the officer 
was made by the magistrate. When we tried to obtain a copy 
there was nothing there. There was no signed copy of the 
TEE COURT: There's nothing on file here? 
HP GH Ji VI3 : 
state has already filed, which is the warrant signed by the 
officer with Judge West's signature and one a.ffirl-."4- *"""" 4" "' 
prepared with the officer --
TE2 COURT: So 'what's your primary complaint about 
;
 : ;; ;> 
MR. ' GEJlVTS : There's no affidavit, There ' s no f acts 
and Judge West that is required to be made by ::he magi st:rat•= • 
not by the officer. 
TEE COURT: What':: required to be made? 
Tvtp SPJ~«,Vu3 i Ine i *:;v \' Ji Q 
TEE COURT: Okay. Let's say he came in and brought 
a copy of the a f f i d a v i t :! r i o: i M o n d a y, . .:.... r
 r 
whatever the next business days was, do you think that's 
sufficient? 
2£R. GRArv IS : K o. It says at the t ime of issuance. 
It clearly says at the time of issuance the magistrate shall 
Not mavf shall. So the macistrata !".-.: . " - > ..-- i„ nue uirne 
of the issuance of the telephonic warrant or any other 
warrant f he fs got to make a signed copy a: id a copy of the 











ly. 3ut it's 
THE COURT: 
at the time of the issu 
I guess ITm wondering, 





to base the 
is required under th 













a copy c 
t he told th 
is not good 
te make the 
the rule rig 
TE3 COURT: 
to him or e-
KR. GRAVIS: 
te could fil 
No. My point is 
the a 
— 
I'm just trying to unde 
ing about. 
Our complaint is 
search warrant on. 
e statute has to be 
not done here. So 
e magistrate becaus 
enough. The law re 
recording, not the 
nt here m front of 
So in other words 
mailed it to him? 
That might t>e goc 
e that at the time 
or have a copy, but he didn't. 




.ance of the 















s that the 
er. I have 
had faxed 




f the warrant, which the rule specif 











KR. SHAW: Yeah. I think 40 (1) and 40(1) are 
mutually exclusive given the change m the law and statute, 
10 
t n e Kind or t n m g 
r s s t i n a ws h. 
.mportant part is was Officer Turley s* 
::: :.e :es:::v accurate-" 
.en I D :::5in :r.e wari: 
cirpy vcirh ire, but _ don' 
T ^ ••-»r c r- :=> ' 
warrants, 
x :o :aJ:; 
ma as, 
£CR. SRA.VT S : 0 k a y . 
rp'^-TFj COURT: I'll get you a decision when I get 
[n the meantime, I guess we'll leave che tri a] c 
" 1 assume the state will proceed on ~ S 1 
anyway, regardless of the warrant, or trie arridavit o: 
test results, the blood sample? 
MR. SE.&W: Yeah. • It may change our prospects fc: 
negotiations, though, Your Honor. x coi 
\ ; ; - f- a 
:rI3 COURT: All rioht i 11 do mv best to qet 
decision out to yo . ..J -J other things on the table als-: 
GRAVIS: We have a pretrial scheduled in two 
weeics. 








| a rev 











er 1st through 
is set. 
MR. 
Does it show a nonjury trial setting? 
No, a jury setting. All right. Thank 
Thank you, Your Honor. 
Your Honor, I received a telephone call 
t who will be out of the country from 
October 19th, which is right when this 
I would ask that we strike that date. 
GRAVIS: 






















who it i _s, but 
Just leave it until the pretrial and 
don't have any problem if we strike the 
me of the pretrial. 
Should we strike the trial and set it for 
r decision? 1 
Ird like to leave it where it is. If 
to proceed to trial, I don't want to 
tew trial date. They won't need the 
If in fact we lose we won't need the 
I've got another jury trial starting 
another person named Dominguez. I don't 
it's obviously not this person. But it 
may be bumped anyway. Let's just leave it alone for now and 
Irll 
! 
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my notes on this, it 
violation of 
wirh that rul 
warrant, whic 
vou refer bac 
that the magi 
search warren 
! difficult to 
} unless you ac 
have the faci 
the rule 
State of Utah versus William Ooiriinguez, 
This is set for pretrial, but itTs 
.on — 
Yes, a decision on the motion to 
ewing the rule again and after reviewing 
would appear that there's a technical 
, of the new rule. Part of the problem 
e is that it provides for a telephonic search 
h was do 
k to the 
strate s 
t and th 
do when 
ne, authorized by Judge West. But if 
previous part of the rule it requires 
imultaneously is supposed to seal the 
e affidavit. Well, that's somewhat 
you have a telephonic search warrant, 
tually physically tape record it, which we don't 
lity to 
So although there 
was never fil 
problem, but 
law, that tha 
the remedy is 
[ 1ZR. 




, but I 
GRAVIS: 
think v, 
but I need some time 
1 TrtZ COURT: 
do that. 
!s a technical glitch, and I realize it 
r and that's another part of the 
believe, given my review of the case 
dates the warrant. I'm not sure what 
don't think it invalidates the warrant. 
Okay, Your Honor, then we need to pass 
•e're going to resolve it anyway today, 
to talk with Mr. Shaw. 
Okay. That's fine. We had to strike 
2 
W 1 *. r.r S3 Ur.aVailaOlllt " "
 f 
ahead and talk and we ' 1 
MR. GRAVIS: If we can recall numr 
.i --.am 
h a d a r 
i, -'_,-, -, 
TEE COURT: Stare versus William Dominguez. 
2£R. GRAV*is* Yo; :r Honcr( a 3 I indicated before, we 
esolution, i just needed to clarify a couple of 
s going to plead quilt; . - '.J,.. • d decree felony 
The state will dismiss the remaining 
- 'insurance . or 
appeal the court's decision on one morion ro suppress. 
!£H. SHAW: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay For c: :.e record on my decision 
again,, so it's clear in case there is an appeal. Although; 
tnere mav nave oeen a .avion m 
t: to search warrant and affidavit were nor delivered t: the 
courthouse sealed, the rule also contemplates somef* . • :: 
that's virtually impossible to do when you have a telephonic 
search warrant and that's to simultaneously have the 
magistrate seal it. There would be no reason to do it over 
the phone if that was the case. I think that's a'problem 
that needs to be strsichtened out bv - •  -  -tie. • 
— • • r e c o g n i z e the sea rch warrant and a f f i d a v i t 
3 
were not filed by the officer with the court, although it wa.s 
highly likely that the judge had ordered him to do so. Those 
types of things are pro forma and I don't believe that based 
en that alone it would invalidate the search warrant when 
there was otherwise probable cause to issue it. It was done 
under oath by the officer on the phone after Judge West swore 
him in, according to the testimony. I think that's 
sufficient to at least justify the issuance of the search 
warrant and the action on the search warrant. 
I don't know if that creates anything additional or not? 
MR. GRAVIS: No. 
T~LE COURT: Okay. I'm sure I brought the file out 
with me, but now we can't seem to find it. I know you're in 
a hurry to attend a meeting. "We can either pass it for a 
moment or come back to it next week. 
(Pause in the proceedings.) 
TEE COURT: We'll do it next Tuesday. We'll do it 
Tuesday at two o'clock. This was a date for a decision only 
anyway. I'll strike the trial date, assuming you're going to 
be entering pleas. 
MR. GRAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor. That's all the 
matters I have. 
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